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International Abductions, Low-Intensity
Conflicts and State Sovereignty:
A Moral Inquiry
FERNANDo R. TEs6N*
INTRODUCTION
On April 2, 1990, agents of the United States government
kidnapped Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, from
Mexico.1 He was accused of having participated in the torture and
murder of an American agent of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency. Ignoring Mexican protests, the Drug Enforcement Agency
flew the suspect to Texas to stand trial.2 In a stunning opinion, the
United States Supreme Court, reversing a lower court's decision,
ruled that American courts had jurisdiction to try the case, even if the
United States government had violated international law by abductin9
Alvarez-Machain in disregard of an extradition treaty with Mexico.
The Supreme Court first found that the American courts did in fact
have jurisdiction in the case.4 It then held that the executive branch,
not the courts, should decide whether or not Alvarez-Machain should
be returned to Mexico.5
Scholarly criticism has focused on the controversial legal
arguments marshalled by the Court. In particular, the Court has been
rightly criticized for its refusal to apply international customary law
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. J.D., 1975, Universidad de Buenos
Aires; Licenci6 en droit international, Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles; S.J.D., 1987, North-
western University. This article grew out of a paper presented at the Low-Intensity Sym-
posium organized by the U.S. Department of Defense, Naval War College, Rhode Island,
April 9-11, 1992. I am grateful to the participants in that symposium, in particular to Terry
Nardin, for their useful comments. Many thanks also to the students in my International
Jurisprudence seminar at Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law for their helpful
comments.
1. See Robert Pear, Justice Department Scrambles to Explain Abduction Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1990, § 1, at 24.
2. IL
3. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.Ct. 2188 (1992).
4. Id. at 2196-97.
5. I. at 2196.
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6in deciding the jurisdictional question. Others have defended the
Court's decision,7 but there is little disagreement that the abduction
violated international law. 8 Even the Supreme Court conceded that
the abduction "may [have] be[en] in violation of general international
law principles."9
In this paper I wish to explore the question raised in Alvarez-
Machain from a different angle: what are the moral principles
bearing on operations such as an international abduction? 0 Inter-
national abductions are part of a larger category of international acts
referred to as "low-intensity" operations.11 Can these acts be
morally justified in time of peace? Can the Mexicans, for example,
rightfully claim that abductions of persons like Alvarez-Machain, who
are suspected of horrendous crimes,1 2 violate Mexican sovereignty?
Does the interest of the United States in bringing such persons to trial
outweigh the Mexican sovereignty claim? If not, what interest of the
United States could possibly justify the abduction? In any case, are
abductions ever morally justifiable?1 3
The traditional view is that, absent conditions that would justify
a state of war, low-intensity operations are barred because of the
principle of state sovereignty. Following a famous dictum in the
6. See Michael L Glennon, State Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1992). Professor Glennon points out that the
Court does not quite deny that international abductions are prohibited by customary law. The
Court simply believes that the Executive is free to disregard customary law when
apprehending suspects abroad. See 112 S.Ct. at 2195-96.
7. See Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-
Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736 (1992); see also Mitchell J. Matorin, Unchaining the Law:
The Legality of Extraterritorial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907 (1992)
(criticizing the lower court's ruling that the illegality of the abduction deprived the courts of
jurisdiction).
8. See Glennon, supra note 6, at 746-47.
9. 112 S.Ct. at 2196.
10. I am using the Alvarez-Machain abduction as an example of the kind of operation
I have in mind. This paper is not solely about that incident, but rather is about the
relationship between any such international coercion during peacetime and the sovereignty
of affected states.
11. See infra part I.
12. Dr. Alvarez-Machain allegedly kept the torture victim alive so that the interrogation
could continue. 112 S.Ct. at 2190.
13. In my view, the answer to the moral question is determinative of the answer to the
legal question. See Fernando R. Tes6n, International Obligation and the Theory of
Hypothetical Consent, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 84, 84-89 (1990). Whatever one's views may
be about the relationship between law and morality, surely at the very least a discussion of
these moral questions can serve to illuminate the debate on the wisdom and desirability of
low-intensity international coercion such as abductions and other forms of covert operations.
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Lotus case, this approach maintains that no enforcement action can
ever be taken in the territory of another sovereign state.14 Accord-
ing to this traditional positivist view, when one state sponsors an
international abduction in the territory of any other state, it violates
the sovereignty of the latter state, regardless of whether it is legiti-
mate or illegitimate, friend or foe, democratic or tyrannical, aggres-
sive or peaceful. The positivist view sanctions abandoning most
principles of state sovereignty only when the circumstances that
justify war prevail. When open war is justified, respect for state
sovereignty is diminished enough to allow acts of intervention, such
as low-intensity operations. When the reasons to wage open war do
not apply, the argument goes, then acts of intervention short of war
are prohibited out of respect for the sovereignty of the target state.
This traditional view assumes that respect for another state's
sovereignty is an all-or-nothing concept. Ordinarily, a state should
consider foreign territory inviolate; however, when the target state is
on the wrong side of a just war, its claims to territorial sovereignty
collapse, permitting its foes to employ the full range of military
remedies, including, of course, low-intensity operations. 5 This
argument concludes that peacetime low-intensity operations, such as
the Alvarez-Machain abduction, are morally prohibited on account of
the sovereignty of the target state. Respect for a foreign state's
sovereignty is thus said to be the moral principle underlying the well-
established legal prohibition on state-sponsored international abduc-
tions and other low-intensity operations.
I believe that this traditional positivist proposition is too
extreme. By presupposing an antiquated and rigid notion of sover-
eignty, the traditional positivist view fails to make crucial distinctions
which are relevant for the moral justification of all international acts.
More specifically, I reject the twin premises that state sovereignty is
an intrinsic value, or a self-sustaining and autonomous moral
principle, and that state sovereignty is an all-or-nothing concept,
according to which all states are equally sovereign by virtue of their
statehood. I suggest instead that state sovereignty is an instrumental
value supported by moral principles linked to human rights and
respect for individual autonomy.
14. "[The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State...
[is] that... it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.' S.S.
Lotus (Fr, v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).
15. A just war is, for example, a war waged by a state in self-defense against an
aggressor.
1994]
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The moral reasons supporting an act of intervention should be
weighed against the moral reasons that support state sovereignty, and
the result of that contest cannot be determined in advance. Instead,
a low-intensity operation such as the abduction of Alvarez-Machain
is morally justified only when it meets the following conditions:
* The ends of the operation are morally justified. An
international act of coercion, including war, is justified if,
and only if, it is undertaken in the defense of the basic
rights of persons and, derivatively, in the defense of just
institutions.
- The government contemplating the operation is a legiti-
mate government.
* Either the target state or the target government is ille-
gitimate.
* The operation does not otherwise violate human rights.
" The operation is necessary and proportionate in terms of
both the moral worth of the cause and of the harm done.
* The modus operandi is not such that would undermine
the flourishing of civic and personal virtues that a liberal
democracy must encourage.
The moral legitimacy of a low-intensity operation depends
absolutely upon the justice of the cause it is intended to further, and
relatively upon the legitimacy of the social contract in the target state.
Only legitimate governments have moral standing to conduct these
operations, but they may not proceed when the target state is also
fully legitimate (in the sense explained below). Even when the target
government or state is not legitimate, those performing the low-
intensity operation must make every effort to respect the individual
rights of the persons that reside in the state. The twin requirements
of necessity and proportionality apply to the conduct of international
coercion generally.
Finally, even if all the foregoing conditions are met, some modi
operandi may be so odious that they should be avoided, since
employing them would undermine the civic and individual virtues that
a liberal democracy must cultivate. In other words, some operational
methods may have a highly corrupting effect. Virtue theory thus
provides an important supplement to the liberal theory upon which
this paper primarily rests.
In light of these requirements, I suggest that the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain by United States agents was unjustified because it
punctured the sovereignty of a morally legitimate state, in violation
[31:551
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of the extradition procedures freely chosen by the two liberal,
democratic states involved. My thesis does not entail the sweeping
proposition discussed above, defended by traditional positivists, that
any international abduction is prohibited, regardless of the legitimacy
of the states or causes invoilved. Sovereignty is bound up with
legitimacy, and legitimacy depends upon observance of human
fights. 1
6
I. A DEFINITON OF LOW-INTENSrrY CONFLICT
Before tackling our substantive problem, I would like to narrow
the kind of low-intensity operations that will be discussed in this
paper. There is some confusion as to what kinds of intervention
should fall under the heading of "low-intensity conflict." It is
certainly agreed that it does not include "high-intensity conflict," or
all-out war. Short of this extreme, however, there no unanimity.
Some writers have defined low-intensity conflict in a noticeably broad
way, including everything short of total war.' For example, some
scholars have treated the 1986 U.S. bombing raid of Libya as an
instance of low-intensity conflict because it was a limited operation
short of total war. 18 The problem with this broad definition is that
limited uses of conventional military force are best analyzed as part
16. I have elsewhere defended this view of international legitimacy. See FERNANDo R.
TEs6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 53-94, 111-
23 (1988); Tes6n, supra note 13, at 112-16; Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of
International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 53, 60-74 (1992).
17. For example, see the definition by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve
political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protract-
ed and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures
through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally
confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on
the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.
Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, Executive Summary (Fort Monroe,
Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, August 1986), quoted in Loren B.
Thompson, Low Intensity Conflict: An Overview, in Low INTENSITY CONFLICr 1, 3 (Loren
B. Thompson ed., 1989). For a summary of criticisms to this definition, see Thompson,
supra, at 3. See also Bernard F. McMahon, Low-Intensity Conflict: The Pentagon's
Foible, ORBIS, Winter 1990, at 3, 4 (offering a long list of missions that fall under the
heading of low-intensity conflict).
18. See, e.g., William V. O'Brien, Counterterror, Law, and Morality, in Low INTENSITY
CONFLICT, supra note 17, at 187, 199-204.
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of the conduct of war.19 Therefore, I treat limited military force
merely as an instance of conventional warfare, much in the way
customary international law treats it.20 Since the justification for
limited warfare does not differ from the justification for war
generally, no additional moral analysis is needed. I will not,
therefore, include instances of limited conventional war in my
analysis.
The operations that pose distinct ethical problems, and those
with which I am concerned here, are those that do not constitute overt
conventional war, limited or unlimited. I define a low-intensity
operation as a limited coercive act, not involving the military, and
therefore lacking the characteristics of even limited conventional war,
performed by a government in a foreign state, without the consent of
the targeted state's government. In a low-intensity operation, a
government exercises coercive power in territory in which, under
ordinary circumstances, it has no jurisdiction to exercise such power.
The Alvarez-Machain abduction thus qualifies as a low-intensity
operation under this general definition.
Even this narrowed definition encompasses a vast range and
variety of operations with very different ends and means, such as
counterterrorism, suppression and support of insurgency, narcotics
enforcement, and the targeting of individuals such as political leaders.
All of these actions are performed in the territory of another
sovereign state, and none involves the use of conventional military
force, even in a limited fashion.
There has been very little scholarly discussion of the moral
justification of low-intensity conflict using this limited definition. To
be sure, throughout the history of philosophy, the morality of war
itself has been the subject of intense concern and debate.21 The
philosophers' preoccupation with war derives from the horror and
finality of physical combat of nation against nation, army against
army. In a very primal way, the frightening reality of war tests the
limits of reason, and thus of civilization itself. It is no surprise,
19. Harry G. Summers, Jr. believes that such expressions as "low intensity conflict" and
"police action" are niceties used to disguise war, especially by the United States. Col. Harry
G. Summers, Jr., A War Is a War Is a War Is a War, in Low-INTENSITY CONFLICr, supra
note 17, at 27, 27.
20. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 101-02 (June 27) (distinguishing between "most grave" and "less
grave" prohibited uses of force in customary international law).
21. For an influential modem reappraisal of the morality of war, see MICHAEL WALZER,
JusT AND UNJUST WARs: A MORAL ARGUMENT wrrH HISTOCAL ILLUSTRATiONS (1977).
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therefore, that no less an eminent thinker than Immanuel Kant, the
champion of rationalism, called war "the judgment of God," and was
satisfied that the outcome "determines the side on which justice
lies." 22 The irrational quality of war has, I think, goaded philoso-
phers to analyze and understand it with the tools of rational moral
thinking-to domesticate war, as it were.23
In contrast, the vast assortment of operations that have been
designated low-intensity conflicts24 have not been the subject of
much philosophical literature. There are at least two reasons for this
omission. First, low-intensity operations usually do not cause as
much damage and suffering as all out war. Second, and more
important, much of human society has often associated conventional
war, but not low-intensity conflict, with courage, dignity, chivalry and
decency. To many, having fought in a just war (e.g., with the Allies
in World War II) is the mark of the virtuous citizen who is ready to
defend his country (and, sometimes, other peoples' countries) against
evil enemies.'
Low-intensity operations have instead been thought of as
secretive, sleazy, sneaky and not particularly demonstrative of
courage or similar virtues.26 One source of this perception is that
low-intensity operations are the domain of specialists, spies, com-
mando forces and hit squads. It is hard to associate such operatives
with a general, grass-roots, patriotic effort to defend just institutions
against an enemy who threatens them.27 Another source of the ill-
repute attaching to low-intensity operations is that they are often
covert and without warning. Last but not least, they are often aimed
at non-military targets. Low-intensity operations thus run contrary to
traditional ideals of honor and fair fighting.
The result is that low-intensity operations have not been seen to
be worth justifying morally. Many people dismiss them as at best a
22. Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch [1795], in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 107, 110 (Ted Humphrey transl., 1983) [hereinafter Kant,
Perpetual Peace].
23. Contrast this view with Hegel's suggestion that war, far from being an intrinsic evil,
is healthy for the state in that it restores its vitality. See J.N. FINDLAY, HEGEL: A RE-
EXAMINATION 326-27 (1958).
24. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
25. Even having fought honorably in a conventional war on the wrong side is
sometimes regarded as praiseworthy.
26. See, for example, Kant's condemnation of certain forms of low-intensity conflict
in his Sixth Preliminary Article. Kant, Perpetual Peace, supra note 22, at 109-10.
27. Consider the common belief in the intrinsic immorality of the C.I.A., held even by
people who regard the United States as a positive moral force on the whole.
1994]
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necessary evil, strategically required sometimes, perhaps, but
unjustifiable in terms of rational morality. This attitude explains why
literature on the moral justification of low-intensity conflict is so
scarce.2" This dismissive approach to such an important phe-
nomenon of international relations is, however, not satisfactory. One
who believes all use of international coercion is always unjustifiable
could easily enough condemn any low-intensity operation as an
example of such coercion. Most of us, however, are not such
extreme pacifists. We need, therefore, to develop a moral analysis to
apply to operations which fall short of open warfare.
The difficulty in devising any moral framework applicable to
low-intensity operations is the variety of morally relevant facts
implicated in their execution. For example, consider the differences
between aiding the Iraqi population to overthrow Saddam Hussein,
and training death squads aimed at innocent civilians in El Salvador;
or between abducting a suspected criminal in Mexico without waiting
for the Mexican authorities to act, and sending a commando force to
liberate hostages held in a foreign country by a group tolerated by the
local government. Whether an action should be frowned upon as
morally deficient will depend on the facts of the particular case.
II. THE ENDS OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Low-intensity conflict is a form of international coercion. This
coercion may involve varying degrees of violence.29 At the very
least, low-intensity operations involve violation of the sovereignty of
another state. In other words, the low-intensity operation impinges
on the monopoly on coercive power that pertains to a government in
its territory, and is recognized by international law. In many other
cases, low-intensity operations will involve actual violence to persons
or damage to property. What aims can morally justify such actions?
Can a government invoke the national interest, or national security,
or self-defense, or expediency, or the need to punish criminals? Is
something else required in the form of justification? Writers have
differed on the answer to these questions.
28. The only article on this specific issue is that of William V. O'Brien, supra note 18,
but it does not go beyond very general remarks about international law and just war doctrine.
29. See Sam C. Sarkesian, The American Response to Low-Intensity Conflict: The
Formative Period, in ARMmS IN Low-INTENSrY CONFLICT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 19,
21 (David A. Charters & Maurice Tugwell eds., 1989) (showing a continuum of coercion in
different types of conflict).
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A. The Realist Answer
Realists have long maintained that international behavior can be
explained by postulating an overriding motivation, one that is the
same for all international actors, especially nation-states: the national
interest. The realist school sees the task of the science of internation-
al relations as the study of the interactions of distinct national
interests, which produce international phenomena, both cooperative
and confrontational. 0  Realism so defined attempts a descriptive
explanation of international behavior. Whatever its merits as a thesis
of political science (i.e. whether or not realism adequately describes
and explains international behavior), there is nothing in it that
logically entails a moral justification of international behavior. The
realist can consistently claim that a state committed an action because
it advanced its national interest, but that on independent moral
grounds the act was unjustified. The realist need not claim that the
national interest itself serves to justify international acts.
Many descriptive realists have, however, almost imperceptibly
slipped into a normative realist approach. Normative realism is the
view that national interest justifies international behavior.3 Two
bases for normative realism have emerged. Some realists have
adopted a state-of-nature approach to international relations, i.e. the
Hobbesian position that nations are at (potential) war with each
other.32 According to this view, all is fair in war, and the only rule
applicable to the state is one of prudential rationality. In a phrase,
the state should act only to advance its national interest. According
to this view, there is no such thing as justice or morality across
borders. Realists are thus skeptical regarding any claims of morality
in international policy.33 Under this theory, a government errs when
30. Seminal works in the realist tradition include HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLmcs
AMONG NATIONS (1959); KENNETH WALTz, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR (1959); and
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SoCIETY (1977). I realize, of course, that I am
oversimplifying realism. The doctrine has many variations, yet I deal in the text with the
central and, as far as I know, uniform methodology of national-interest analysis.
31. See, e.g., George F. Kennan, Morality and Foreign Policy, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 205,
205-08, 217 (1985-86).
32. 2 THOMAS HOBBES, ON DOMINION ch. 13, in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS
HOBBES OF MALMESBuRY, 63, 169 (Sir William Molesworth ed., 1841) ("For the state of
commonwealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile."). See generally
HOBBES: WAR AMONG NATIONS (Timo Airaksinen & Martin A. Bertman eds., 1989). For
a modem version of this view, see TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS
OF STATES (1983).
33. For a convincing response to the realists' moral skepticism, see Marshall Cohen,
Moral Skepticism and International Relations, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1984).
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it does something it believes is in the national interest, but in reality
is not; the leaders should have perceived the real national interest and
acted on it, but failed to do so.
The second path to normative realism involves considerations of
constitutional philosophy. Under liberal democratic theory, the
government is the agent of the people. It is employed by the citizens
of the state to serve their interests. A consequence of this agency
relationship is that significant deviations from this purpose, such as
when the government advances only its own interests, are grounds for
criticism or, in the extreme, for declaring the illegitimacy of that
government. Ultimately, betrayal of the democratic mandate may
even justify overthrowing that government. These are the terms of
the vertical social contract, the contract between people and govern-
ment.' This contract essentially specifies that the agent, i.e. the
government, is obliged to govern in the interest of the principal, i.e.
the governed.
Under this view, the duty of a government to serve the interests
of its subjects is the paramount rule in international relations." A
government does not owe any duty to foreigners, since they do not
stand in any contractual relationship with it. As in the state-of-nature
approach, prudence alone serves to limit foreign policy options. For
example, a government seeking to advance its citizens' interests too
aggressively may cause other states to retaliate, thereby harming those
it sought to benefit.
This view is appealing because it relies on democratic govern-
ment within states to validate amoral behavior among states. Since
governments are agents that represent their citizens, each government
should attempt to further the interests of its citizens in unbridled
competition with other governments. Any state should determine how
to act internationally by analyzing its interests and the available
options, and rationally choosing the options expected to maximize
those interests. There are no international principles of morality,
unless morality itself is defined in terms of the rational choice just set
forth.
From the realist standpoint, for example, American support for
the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion was mistaken, not because it was
morally wrong, as an instance of aggression or impermissible
34. See infra part I.
35. Professor Marshall Cohen attributes this view to Spinoza. Marshall Cohen, Moral
Skepticism and International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL ETics 3, 4 (Charles R. Beitz et
al. eds., 1985).
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intervention, but because the United States government miscalculated
the benefits that the invasion would bring to the United States. Had
the invasion succeeded and brought about the planned consequences,
it would have been unobjectionable. The realist may accuse a
government of imprudence-an inability to foresee disaster-but not
of immorality. Both the state-of-nature version of normative realism
and this latter version, based on the agency relationship between
government and citizenry, conclude that national interest is the sole
measure of international acts.
B. Extreme and Moderate Realism
According to normative realism, international acts-including
low-intensity operations-are justified if they serve the national
interest. We must, however, make a further distinction between
extreme realism and moderate realism.
According to extreme realism, acts are justified whenever they
advance the national interest. Extreme realists thus regard the
furthering of the national interest as a sufficient reason to carry out
any operation. For example, the extreme realist would say that when
the United States government was deciding whether to abduct
Alvarez-Machain from Mexico,36 it should have balanced the
expected national benefits in bringing him to justice with the potential
adverse consequences of the operation. Benefits could include
punishing an offender and deterring criminals from seeking shelter in
other countries. Possible harms could spring from hostile Mexican
responses, such as severing diplomatic relations or taking the case to
an international organization like the United Nations. If, on balance,
the benefits to the national interest outweighed the risks, then the
abduction would have been justified on realist grounds. That the
operation might kill some innocent Mexicans or cause significant
property damage in Mexico would not have weight except insofar as
American interests would be affected thereby, since the extreme
realist believes the U.S. government owes no duty to Mexicans.
Moderate realism, on the other hand, contends that maximizing
the national interest is a necessary, but not a sufficient reason to
36. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. For a similar factual scenario, see
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 112 S.Ct. 2986 (1992) (Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and resident of
Mexico, was apprehended in Mexico by several individuals who were either U.S. agents or
Mexicans working for the U.S. Once in U.S. territory Verdugo-Urquidez was charged with
various offenses).
1994]
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justify an international act. International acts are justified when they
further the national interest and also comply with moral principles
and the requirements of necessity and proportionality applicable to all
uses of force.37 In our example, the moderate realist might assert
that the abduction of Alvarez-Machain could be morally justified only
after all other means to persuade the Mexican government to render
the suspects had failed, and then only if no Mexican lives were lost,
since the American interest in preventing criminals from seeking safe
haven in other countries arguably supersedes property considerations,
but not the loss of lives.
C. Utilitarian and Communitarian Realism
One preliminary question for the evaluation of realism is what
counts as national interest. Realists have two very different answers
to this question. The first one is that national interest is the aggregate
of present and future individual interests. The second answer is that
national interest is an enduring interest held by the state or the nation
over and above the interests of the individuals (present and future)
that populate the state.
It seems obvious that there are goals that, if accomplished,
would benefit most people in a country. For example, if American
industry becomes more competitive, most American citizens will
benefit since there would be more wealth and more jobs in the
country. Therefore, diplomatic actions by the U.S. government that
attempt to make U.S. businesses more competitive, such as the
establishment of conditions for fair international trade, serve the
national interest because most people in the country materially benefit
from such action.
This approach defines national interest simply as the aggregate
maximization of interests, or preferences, of the citizens of the state
over time. National interest is explicated by resorting to empirical
laws and theories, and denotes actual preferences and interests of the
people. While such an empirical calculation may be highly compli-
cated, there is nothing conceptually wrong with this method of
defining the national interest. The definition does not refer to
anything more than the actual interests of individuals; in that sense,
the national interest is real, concrete and measurable. I will call this
definition, for want of a better name, the utilitarian conception of
national interest. In its normative form, this thesis holds that the
37. For a discussion of necessity and proportionality, see infra part VI.
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satisfaction of the net aggregate interests of present and future
citizens of the state justifies international acts.
An important consequence of utilitarian realism is that the
justification of international acts is sensitive to empirical claims about
individual preferences. Some claims are simply empirically false,
such as appeals to the national interest when the interest that is being
served is that of a minority, to the detriment of the population at
large. The validity of claims that foreign policy serves the national
interest is thus determined by empirical tests.
In our example, the utilitarian realist must consider possible
consequences to the interests of citizens of the state in order to decide
whether or not the abduction of Alvarez-Machain is justified. A poll
that showed popular support for the abduction of Alvarez-Machain
would count in favor of the abduction. Likewise, an opinion poll
showing opposition to the abduction would factor against executing
the operation." The morally justified decision by the government
would be the one that advanced the interests of the citizens of the
state, and one way to measure these interests is to calculate their
actual preferences at any given moment. (Of course, utilitarian
calculations are complicated because future citizens' interests must
also be considered.)
Some realists, however, have a different conception of the
national interest. For them, national interest is not reducible to the
aggregate interests of the citizens of the state. They reject the
utilitarian claim that the national interest should be determined with
reference to the current and future preferences of the people. These
realists advance instead a holistic definition of national interest.
National interest is ascribed to the state or nation as a whole. The
national interest is held by the nation or the state as a moral being
that endures over time.39  This interest survives the change of
internal socio-political arrangements and of governments. Instead of
emphasizing actual preferences or interests, this view stresses
communal considerations such as national glory or tradition, and
38. If readers believe that using opinion polls as a way of determining serious political
preferences is silly, I suggest they check how most political arguments are conducted these
days.
39. I have called this idea "the Hegelian Myth." See FaRNANDo R. TES6N, HUMANI-
TARIAN INTERVENTION ch. 3 (1988).
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ethnic or religious pride. I will call this version of realism, for want
of a better name, communitarian realism.4°
Of course, if the majority of the present and future population
feels strongly about national glory or ethnic pride, their preferences
will be maximized by an international act in pursuit of those goals.
In this case, utilitarian and communitarian realism will converge. The
communitarian approach to national interest, however, is not sensitive
to empirical falsification. Communitarians claim that communal
values are to be found in the "intimations of the tradition" of a given
society. If national interest is defined in this way, it will often be the
case that the actual aggregate preferences of present citizens will not
coincide with what is dictated by the "intimations of the tradition."
On a communitarian justification of an international act, the fact that
actual preferences do not coincide with the communitarian interest
does not count against performing the act. This version of realism is
foundationalist, in that an appeal to the foundational principles of the
community trump actual popular preferences.
Communitarian realism has the virtue of rejecting the pure
utilitarian approach to national interest described above. It recognizes
that there may be higher principles that are not honored or appreciat-
ed by the majority of members of the community at a given historical
moment. By refusing to base foreign policy on whatever the citizens
of the state happen to prefer at a given time, or on their self-interest,
communitarian realism can be seen as an attempt to instill morality
into international relations. In many instances the analysis will be
intuitively appealing. For example, an argument against the C.I.A.'s
involvement in the overthrow of Chilean president Salvador Allende
is that such action was incompatible with the principles embedded in
the American tradition. For the United States to engage in that
operation was inconsistent with the American tradition of respect for
human rights and the will of the people. Since this tradition in turn
defines national interest in foreign policy, it prevails over the possible
40. Communitarians have confined themselves to domestic political philosophy. For
representative communitarian views, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrs
OF JUsTICE (1982), and Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POL.
THEORY 6 (1990). To my knowledge, no one has applied communitarian philosophy to
international law and relations. Walzer is a curious case. Even though he is usually seen
as a communitarian philosopher, his views on war are predominantely liberal. Liberal writers
have their own critiques of communitarianism. See Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics
of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 308 (1985); Carlos Nino, The Communitarian Challenge
to Liberal Rights, 8 L. & PHIL. 37 (1989).
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short-term advantage of overthrowing a government perceived as
unfriendly to the United States.41
The communitarian realist has two possible arguments to support
the abduction of Alvarez-Machain. He can claim that the punishment
of crimes, such as torture, that deeply offend American moral
sensibilities, justifies the abduction-especially since the crime was
perpetrated against an American government official. Alternatively,
the communitarian realist could simply contend that the abduction of
Alvarez-Machain is justified as a way to advance the national interest
of fighting the flow of illegal drugs into this country. These positions
are not affected by either the public's support for, or its opposition to,
the operation.
On the other hand, it is possible to supply a communitarian
argument against the abduction. If the communitarian believes that
respect for the international rule of law, embodied in commitments
like treaties, serves important national interests and provides an
incentive for other states to honor their legal commitments, then he
may conclude that the abduction is unjustified. Here again, national
interest is not coextensive with the mere short-term advancement of
collective preferences.
It is worth noting, in passing, that for conmunitarians, too, there
are good and bad communitarian arguments, just as there are good
and bad utilitarian arguments-not all appeals to tradition will suffice.
The debate over the morality of foreign policy is, for the communitar-
ian realist, always a debate about the correct interpretation of the
national tradition.
D. A Critique of Realism
Much of the literature on low-intensity conflict exhibits a
normative realist orientation by focusing on what strategies would
best serve the national interest. But is normative realism a morally
sound principle? I submit that it is not; advancing the national
interest is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to justify
international acts, including low-intensity operations.
I will start with utilitarian realism. This version of realism, as
suggested above, has considerable appeal because it is based on
democratic principles. What could be more attractive than the
41. For a defense of this view, see Kennan, supra note 31, at 214.
42. Any of the essays in Low-INTENsrry CONFLICr, supra note 17, may serve to
illustrate this point.
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suggestion that a government that we institute to defend our interests
should do just that? Yet utilitarianism as a general moral theory has
well-known fatal flaws. In the philosophical literature, the most
devastating critique of utilitarianism comes from a foundationalist
perspective.4 3  International acts may serve the national interest in
a utilitarian sense, yet may be immoral. Just as an individual is
expected to refrain from immoral acts even when they advance his
self-interest, so in international relations governments must refrain
from immoral acts even when they serve the national interest. The
foundationalist critique disagrees with the often unstated premise of
realism that there is no international morality.
This flaw of utilitarian realism can be clearly seen in a well-
known problem of utilitarianism generally: its failure to take into
account human rights. Surely someone committed to liberal
principles would not accept the proposition that a government may
blatantly violate the rights of persons in other countries, provided
only that in doing so it advances the interests of its own citizens. For
example, a government cannot justify killing or oppressing people in
other countries, simply in order to improve the economic condition
of its citizens.
The objection to utilitarian realism is that its premise is fatally
incomplete. A government's job description is not simply to
maximize the interests of the citizens who hire it, but rather to
maximize these interests consistently with respect for human rights.
A morally justified democracy is a rights-constrained democracy, not
a pure democracy where the majority does as it pleases.'
Assuming human rights are international and universal,45 while
our government may have a primary duty to uphold our rights and
our just institutions, it also has a duty to respect the rights of all
people. Just as the majority of a state's people may not oppress
domestic minorities, internationally it may not direct its own
43. The seminal work in this regard is JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
44. See Kant, Perpetual Peace, supra note 22, at 114; see also Tes6n, The Kantian
Theory of International Law, supra note 16, at 60-62.
45. The concept of the universality of human rights has been persistently challenged
over the years (especially by governments who wish to violate them), but I believe that such
universality holds both as a matter of morality and as a matter of positive international law.
See generally Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25
VA. J. INT'L L. 869 (1985) (rejecting relativism as applied to international human rights).
Most recently, the otherwise quite deficient Vienna Declaration has reaffirmed the principle
of universality. See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993 (copy
furnished to the author by the U.S. Department of State), pt. II, para. 1 ("The universal
nature of [human] rights is beyond question.").
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government to ignore the rights of individuals in other states.
Therefore a government's duty to maximize the preferences of its
citizens cannot be a paramount and exclusive international duty.
Utilitarian realism does, however, have a role to play. When a
government performs an international act, such as a low-intensity
operation, that seriously harms the national interest, even if the
behavior serves worthy purposes, the citizens of the government's
state have a claim against it for not doing its job properly. 6
Communitarian realism, unlike utilitarian realism, shares with the
human rights approach its foundationalist quality in that certain
principles trump actual interests and preferences. Yet despite its anti-
utilitarian, foundationalist approach, communitarian realism is also
untenable since, like utilitarian realism, it is indifferent to human
rights.
Under communitarian realism, an international act is justified
when it is consonant with the tradition and the communal values of
the state performing the act. Communitarian realism does not take
into account the resulting harms, including human rights violations,
suffered by non-members of that state.
By postulating some national interest over and above the actual
preferences of citizens, communitarian realism is far more dangerous
than utilitarian realism, in spite of its current vogue; it is too closely
akin to the spurious and destructive themes of nationalism. Perhaps
for that reason, communitarianism is also hopelessly relativistic.
There is no internal principle to prevent the doctrine from being used
to justify appalling r6gimes of oppression and frightful foreign
policies, so long as those practices spring from the tradition of the
society in question. In addition, communitarians lack the moral tools
to come to the defense of dissenters from the tradition. For example,
communitarians are bereft of arguments to defend the victims of the
Tiananmen Square massacre, since arguably despotism has traditional-
ly been part of the "intimation" of Chinese tradition. They also lack
the moral tools to oppose the claim by the religious community47 of
Islamic fundamentalists to forcibly convert infidel nations, if that is
part of the Islamic tradition. Communitarianism is incompatible with
46. When an agent, such as a lawyer, fails to serve the interests of his client, the client
has a claim against the lawyer, even though the lawyer be motivated by the noblest of
concerns.
47. While community may often be seen as defined by national borders, community
may or may not coincide with nations-witness religious communities, or the moral
community of Europe defined by the European Convention on Human Rights, reprinted in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN RiGHTS 499-505 (Edward Lawson ed., 1991).
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international human rights since the very premise of the theory rejects
the notion of transboundary justice or morality.
Unlike utilitarianism, communitarianism does not depend on
principles of democratic representation. Communitarians have no
reason to prefer a democratically elected government that may not
pursue the "intimations of the tradition" to an enlightened, but
democratic government. Indeed, this has been precisely the view of
the most illustrious communitarians. 4
In the earlier example regarding the critique of the C.I.A.'s
involvement in overthrowing Chilean president Salvador Allende,49
an appeal to community seemed acceptable because the tradition it
was based on was morally worthy on grounds other than the simple
fact that it was a tradition-it was a liberal tradition. In such a case,
the communitarian realist arrives at a morally desirable outcome, but
for the wrong reasons. One can of course argue that the C.I.A.'s help
in ousting Allende was immoral because it was inconsistent with the
American tradition of respect for human rights and the popular will.
But what about the people most directly affected? It seems to me
that the operation must be condemned for the effects it had on
Chileans, not for the self-regarding reason that it was inconsistent
with the tradition of the United States.50
A just tradition must be defended because it is just, not because
it is a tradition; conversely, unjust traditions deserve no respect. A
communitarian may reply that the relevant community should be
defined as the international community. Since that community has
agreed to an international law of human rights, international human
rights are now part of the "intimations of the tradition" that determine
the community interest.51  This position, however, amounts to
unconditional surrender, since it makes communitarian realism true,
but trivial. If human rights are universal, then communitarianism is
tantamount to liberalism. The communitarian can no longer identify
48. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk VII. Elsewhere Plato writes: "The wise shall lead
and rule, and the ignorant should follow." PLATO, THE LAWS, *690b. As Karl Popper has
shown, the "Socrates" of the Republic is the embodiment of unmitigated authoritarianism.
1 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SocIETy AND ITS ENEMIES 131 (2d ed. 1966).
49. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
50. The coup opened the door to years of oppressive military government.
51. I take this to be the thrust of the New Haven school, with its emphasis on
clarification of global community policies. See Myres S. Mc Dougal et al., The World
Constitutive Process ofAuthoritative Decision, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 191 (Myres
S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981). For my critique, see TES6N, HUMANITAR-
IAN INTERVENTION, supra note 16, at 17.
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a relevant community as legitimately denying human rights since that
community would also be part of the international community, and
therefore governed by the imperative to honor human rights.
Normative realism, then, fails to supply a sufficient justification
for international acts. Moreover, the pursuit of national interest, in
either the utilitarian or communitarian versions, does not seem to be
a necessary condition to justify international acts either. If we
conclude that there is a duty to assist people in distress, or that there
is a duty to transfer wealth to the needy under appropriate principles
of distributive justice, international morality may mandate internation-
al aid by governments even when those acts do not advance the
national interest of the government taking the action.
In conclusion, normative realism is unappealing in any of its
versions because of its indifference to universal principles of justice,
human rights in particular. Utilitarian realists are correct in seeking
a liberal democratic foundation of national interest, but a constraint
on action based squarely on human rights is needed. Communitarian
realists, on the other hand, are right to seek a foundational approach,
thereby rejecting the utilitarian determination of the national interest;
however, they choose a faulty foundational principle-appeal to
tradition. Both communitarian and utilitarian principles are insensi-
tive to human rights.
E. The Human Rights Approach
The task then is to provide a theoretical basis for international
morality, one that avoids the pitfalls of realism. I contend that an
international act is in principle immoral when it violates human
rights. Should we accept this suggestion, then we can clearly see
why the national interest cannot possibly justify low-intensity
operations that violate the rights of individuals in the target state.
The reason is simply that universal human rights trump the pursuit of
interest. It follows that a morally acceptable description of the
international role of the government is that a government is entrusted
by the citizens of the state with the conduct of foreign affairs so that
the interests of the citizens will be served, provided that global human
rights are respected. The human-rights based theory of international
law is thus compatible with the pursuit of the national interest in the
utilitarian sense, with human rights operating as a side-constraint to
that pursuit.
The first and foremost interest of citizens in a democracy is to
uphold and defend their just institutions; the government, therefore,
has a duty to defend the state's just institutions. In a sense, this
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interest may seem to correspond to that offered by communitarian
realists, since the morality of defending just institutions does not
depend on citizens actually wanting to defend them at any particular
time. A government having the foresight to defend just institutions
against the popular will would be morally justified. As suggested
above, the human-rights theory of international relations is distinct
from communitarian realism, even though they may at times prescribe
the same course of action. In those cases where an appeal to tradition
is desirable, such as when the American tradition of defense of
freedom and democracy is invoked, the communitarian interest is
simply coincidentally in accord with the defense of just institutions.
The liberal, human-rights based view, however, will already have
decided, on independent grounds, that freedom is worth defending.
In short, the government of a just state has a duty to defend its just
institutions because they are just institutions, not because they are its
institutions.
The second duty of a democratic government is to uphold and
promote human rights and democracy globally. This tenet is
supported by two reasons, first suggested by Immanuel Kant.53 The
first reason is simply that human rights are universal, as indicated
above. Human rights accrue to every human being, regardless of
history, culture or geographical circumstance. Every person has an
equal claim to be treated with dignity and respect: this is the ethical
foundation of international human rights. The second reason why
governments must uphold human rights and democracy globally is
that this is the only way to secure peace.' By encouraging the
creation and preservation of democratic societies abroad, the
democratic government is building the liberal alliance, which alone
can serve as the basis for a stable international community. Liberal
democracies are far less prone to make war than illiberal r6gimes5
The coexistence of democratic and undemocratic regimes is the main
cause of global conflict, because those two radically different political
systems do not easily coexist.
We can now summarize the normative basis of foreign policy.
A democratic government has a three-fold international duty: (1) to
defend its own just institutions; (2) to respect the rights of all
52. An example of this is the refusal of the French government to accept the surrender
of the French people to the Nazi occupiers during World War II.
53. I have developed the following arguments in Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of
International Law, supra note 16.
54. Id at 74-81.
55. Id
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persons at home and abroad; and (3) to promote the preservation and
expansion of human rights and democracy globally. These three
ways of upholding human rights differ, however. The first duty of a
government is to defend its just institutions; this duty is perhaps the
only absolute duty that governments have. The second duty of a
democratic government is to respect human rights, including
protection of the rights of foreign persons when it conducts otherwise
permissible low-intensity operations. This duty is very strong,
although perhaps not always absolute.56 The third duty of a demo-
cratic government, which is related to the second, is to defend and
promote respect for human rights by foreign governments. This duty
is strong, yet constrained by moral and prudential considerations that
relate to the rights of innocent people in the target state, as well as to
the capabilities of the acting state, its resources, and the safety of its
citizens.57
The corollary of the foregoing considerations is that a low-
intensity operation will be justified if, and only if, it is consistent with
respect for global human rights. A government may pursue the
national interest, either in the utilitarian sense (defined as the
satisfaction of the aggregate preferences or interests of the citizens of
the state), or in the (putative) communitarian sense of defending just
institutions, provided that in doing so it respects the rights of
everybody. This version of moderate realism, therefore, is acceptable
because the pursuit of human rights and the defense of just institu-
tions operate as a moral constraint on the pursuit of national interest.
The human rights approach helps us analyze one kind of low-
intensity operation: insurgency and counter-insurgency. The human
rights approach includes a theory of just war; it is the war waged in
defense of human rights.5 8 In most wars, international or civil, there
is a side that is morally right. That side may be waging a war to
defend itself from an aggressor, or to overthrow a tyrannical
56. There are a number of reasons to support the view that states legitimately have
lesser duties vis-h-vis foreigners. These are analogous to the reasons that individuals have
a greater duty toward their family members than to others. Yet even these subordinate duties
are absolute within their proper compass: the fact that we normally do more things for the
people that are close to us does not mean that we can violate the rights of others.
57. Notice that I am talking here about duties, not rights. I take for granted, at this
stage of development of international law, that democratic governments have a right to
demand human rights compliance from other governments and, in some extreme cases, even
to intervene by force to help victims of serious oppression. See generally TES6N,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 16, at 112-14.
58. See TEStN, HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 16, at 113; see also David
Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 60 (1980).
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government (at home or abroad), or justly to secede from a parent
state.59 Insurgency operations by a democratic state designed to
assist just revolutionaries are justified, provided that the help is
welcome by the insurgents themselves. For example, a response to
a request for assistance by Iraqi revolutionaries aimed at overthrowing
Saddam Hussein would be morally justified. Similarly, counter-
insurgency operations to assist legitimate, rights-respecting govern-
ments against illiberal uprisings are morally justified, provided that
the government welcomes the assistance.60
Assistance to illegitimate governments, or illiberal groups in
civil wars, on the grounds that they are friends of the legitimate
government carrying out the operation, is forbidden in principle. A
very important corollary of the human-rights theory of international
law and relations is that, normally, only legitimate governments may
be supported.61 The liberal alliance envisioned by Kant, and
hopefully taking shape in the post-Cold-War international society, is
the only plausible foundation of international law, and illegitimate
governments are excluded from its benefits.62 This point sharply
brings out the contrast between the human-rights approach and
realism. Many realists have maintained that, in foreign policy, we
should support our "friends," even if they are despicable dictators.63
Leaving aside for the moment the very plausible claim that in
59. See generally ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESsION: THE MORALITY OF POLMCAL
DiVORCE FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC (1991) (advocating various
arguments as moral grounds for the right to secede).
60. This proviso derives from considerations of autonomy, which apply to acts in
defense of others. See Judith J. Thomson, Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 305-306
(1991). But self-defense of the state is always, in effect, defense of others. In repelling an
aggressor, the government assists citizens who are being victimized by aggression, and
individuals fight in defense of fellow citizens. It follows that, as I have tried to show
elsewhere, the rationale for self-defense does not differ in substance from the rationale for
humanitarian intervention. See TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 16, 113-
14; see also Tes6n, International Obligation and the Theory of Hypothetical Consent, supra
note 13, at 117.
61. I say "in principle' and "normally" because one can imagine a situation where the
only way to avoid a moral catastrophe is to temporarily support an illegitimate government.
An interesting such case arises when two tyrants are fighting each other. Here the liberal
democracy must refrain from helping either, except in very extreme situations, such as when
one tyrant, if victorious, will drop a nuclear bomb or cause a similar catastrophe. But it is
never morally right to support a tyrant against a democracy, or a tyrant against democratic
forces resisting him, or illiberal rebels against a democratic government.
62. See Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law, supra note 16, at 89-93.
63. Even in the midst of the current global democratic revolution, we can see the
endurance of this ruthless approach: Western governments befriend the Syrian dictator Hafez
al-Assad and the current Chinese leadership, on account of spurious "national interest."
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realism's own terms such a policy is disastrous in the long run, the
human-rights theory condemns this view as profoundly immoral. 4
The human-rights based justification of international acts is still
very general, and at first blush many will find it unsatisfactory. One
possible objection is based on principles of state sovereignty. A low-
intensity operation may be conducted in such a surgical way that no
one's rights are violated, yet the sovereignty of the target state would
still have been punctured. That violation of sovereignty, it is argued,
suffices to bar the legitimacy of low-intensity operations, such as the
abduction of Alvarez-Machain. In order to assess this objection, one
must examine the ethical foundations of state sovereignty.
IT[. THE JUSTIFICATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Low-intensity operations violate the sovereignty of the target
state. In some cases, as discussed above, there are moral reasons to
make war. The overriding aim of a just war is the protection of
human rights. A government's war to defend the rights of its
citizens, when they are being violated by a foreign aggressor, is
called self-defense. A government's war to defend the citizens of the
target state from human rights violations by their own government is
called humanitarian intervention.
The twin principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention are
among the best established principles of international law. A liberal
conception of politics is one for which the justified civil society
protects and recognizes basic human rights, of the type named in
modern constitutions and pertinent international instruments.' A
liberal conception of state sovereignty has to be congruent with the
justification it offers for the legitimacy of the state generally. I
suggest that a state is internationally legitimate when it is internally
legitimate.
The best way to approach the question of the legitimacy of the
state is to distinguish between the horizontal social contract and the
64. We do not even need a very deep theory of morality to condemn the realist's
advocacy of help to "friendly" dictators. Whether one relies on the universality of human
rights (as I do), or on an American or Western communitarian tradition, or on pure
compassion, the result is the same.
65. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (11), 3 U.N.
GAOR (Resolutions, pt. 1) at 71, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
66. I made this point in TES6N, HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 16, at 55-57,
77-94, 112-14. See also CHARLES BEITz, POLITICAL THEORY AD INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1979).
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vertical social contract.67 Citizens of the state are bound to one
another by the principles of justice that underlie a just constitution-
this is the horizontal social contract. Meaningful social cooperation
requires the creation of government, i.e. of institutions and offices to
which political power is attached. These offices are occupied by
persons who are democratically chosen by the citizens of the state.
These persons enter, therefore, into an agency relationship with the
people who have elected them. This agency relationship is the
vertical social contract. In a democracy, the government is account-
able to the people and has to remain faithful to the terms of the
vertical contract.
From this, it follows that illegitimacy may take place in two
ways. First, the vertical contract may be breached, in which case the
government is illegitimate. This occurs when the government is
unrepresentative or, even if it was originally representative, it engages
in serious and disrespectful human-rights violations. The government
has lost its standing since it no longer represents the citizens.
Second, the horizontal social contract may break down, so that the
state is illegitimate. This situation could result in anarchy, as in
Somalia, or in a fragmentation of the parent state into several
independent states, as happened to the Soviet Union.
Sovereignty is the external aspect of legitimacy. A government
is legitimate when it genuinely represents the people and generally
respects human rights. Such a government must be respected by
foreigners, in particular foreign governments. A state is legitimate,
and must be respected, when it is the result of a genuine horizontal
social contract. In turn, a legitimate social contract, for instance a
legitimate constitution, is one that, at the very least, protects the basic
human rights of its citizens. Such a state must likewise be respected
by foreigners, in particular foreign governments.
A group of people residing in a territory, bound by a legitimate
horizontal contract, may rescind the vertical contract as a result of a
breach by their government. This may occur violently, as by
revolution, or peacefully. The government in power becomes
illegitimate; in other words, the vertical contract has collapsed. In
these cases, citizens have not lost their rights. They have not
forfeited their human rights or their civil society, which is the result
of the social contract that protects such rights. The horizontal social
67. The distinction between the two Idnds of social contracts was suggested by HANNAH
ARENDT, Civil Disobedience, in CRIsES OF THE REPUBLIC 49, 85-87 (1969). I elaborate the
idea here in more detail.
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contract, I emphasize, is derivative from individual rights. They have
given up neither their individual rights nor their life in common, their
commitment to social cooperation.
The illegitimate government, however, is not morally protected.
Foreigners, therefore, have a duty to respect human rights and a life
in common in the state, but do not owe a similar duty to the
illegitimate government, because that government does not legiti-
mately represent the state and its people anymore. In addition, an
illegitimate government is not entitled to respect6 8 because by
hypothesis, if international law offered protection to this government,
it could remain in power and oppress its people without fear of
political pressure from the international community.69
It is possible, however, that the horizontal contract itself may
collapse, causing civil society to disintegrate. There may be an
illegitimate, spurious social contract-one that does not provide for
respect for basic human rights. In these cases, the state is illegiti-
mate. Of course, a fortiori the government will be illegitimate, since
the vertical contract exists at the sufferance of the horizontal contract.
In this case also, as in the case of collapse of the vertical contract, the
former citizens-now stateless people, persons in the state of
nature-maintain their individual rights. 0 Foreigners, and in
particular foreign governments, must respect the human rights of the
individuals that reside in that putative state, notwithstanding the
collapse of the horizontal social contract. If the horizontal contract
collapses, citizens do not have a claim to life in common anymore.
Foreigners, therefore, are not under as stringent a duty to respect that
"society" as in the case of collapse of the vertical contract. They
must respect individual human rights, but there is no longer a social
contract to respect. A group of individuals, not a state or a society,
is all that is left.
In summary, a state is entitled to the complete protection of
state sovereignty afforded by international law when it is founded
upon a legitimate horizontal contract and a legitimate vertical
68. I realize that this is not the thrust of international law, which tends to protect any
government that has succeeded in subduing the population. See TES6N, HuMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION, supra note 16, 53-94.
69. This is not to say that foreigners may do anything with regard to an illegitimate
government. In particular, they may not overthrow it without the consent of the citizens of
the state. Id. at 119-23.
70. Imagine that in an unexplored area of the globe we discover individuals who do not
have any political or social organization, who just wander in the region. Human rights, I
believe, would pertain to them, although I will not attempt to prove this point.
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contract. A state is entitled to less protection of its sovereignty when
the vertical contract has collapsed. While human fights and the right
to a life in common ought to be respected, the illegitimate govern-
ment and its instrumentalities are not entitled to protection. Finally,
when both the horizontal and vertical contract have collapsed, there
is no sovereignty whatsoever, but the individuals that reside within
the boundaries of the defunct state retain their human rights, which
must be respected by foreigners as well as by others in the commons.
We turn now to the application of the principles that support
state sovereignty and how they can trump the pursuit of low-intensity
operations by foreign governments. I shall start with the somewhat
easier question of the moral standing to undertake a low-intensity
operation.
IV. WHO CAN UNDERTAKE A Low INTENSrrY OPERATION
The first consequence of the foregoing considerations is that
only a legitimate government has moral standing to carry out a
legitimate low-intensity operation as a government. Dictators may
not validly perform low-intensity operations. The reason is
straightforward. The vertical contract is invalid and the agency
relationship is spurious; consequently, the government cannot validly
act on behalf of the citizens of the state. Its international acts, and
in particular its coercive acts, such as war and low-intensity opera-
tions, are invalid qua acts of the state.
At first blush, this conclusion seems counter-intuitive. Why
can't the illegitimate government of state A send a group of people
to train and advise the combatants led by the legitimate government
of state B in its fight against illiberal insurgents? Surely B will use
all the help it can get. This, however, will not do-the government
of A cannot validly order citizens of A to fight and perhaps risk their
lives in another state, even for a just cause! Because A's is an
illegitimate government, it lacks the moral standing to command.
The citizens of A are not legitimately subordinate to the government,
and do not have a duty to obey. Of course, any individual has a right
to join in a just war, fought in another state, when invited by the just
warriors.71 If people in A decide voluntarily, and are not deployed
71. I believe that people have a duty to assist, to the extent possible, their fellow
citizens (i.e. citizens of the same state) against an unjust aggression; this is the only possible
justification of conscription enforced by legitimate governments. I will not, however, attempt
to demonstrate this difficult point here.
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by A, to join the just counter-insurgency in B, they could do so in
their private capacity. The illegitimate government may not engage
the people and the collective resources of the state in any war, low-
intensity conflict, or other coercive action.
The position defended here presents a sharp contrast with
realism. Realists, especially communitarians, claim that every state
has a national interest that is as legitimate and important as any other
state's national interest against which it competes in the international
arena. Realists do not seriously consider the possibility that a
government carrying out an operation may simply be unrepresenta-
tive. There are many ways in which the realist bypasses this
inconvenient fact. For example, a realist might argue that there are
political or sociological reasons why the tyrant remains in power, or
that tyranny is a natural phenomenon.72 They might, more plausi-
bly, distinguish between the dictator's domestic illegitimacy and his
international standing to pursue the national interest. This justifica-
tion ignores the fact that the international act performed by the
dictator purports to engage the collective responsibility of the
citizenry. Typically, the act may put the population at grave risk.
Other governments may then legitimately challenge the authority of
the dictator so to act, and this can be done only by resorting to some
notion of domestic legitimacy.
V. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
The question as to whether or not a low-intensity operation, such
as the U.S.-sponsored abduction of Alvarez-Machain, violates the
target state's sovereignty is answered by applying the principles
suggested in the foregoing discussion. Three cases are possible.
First, the target state is fully legitimate, meaning that both the state
and the government are legitimate. Second, the target state rests on
a valid horizontal contract, but the vertical contract is invalid, with
the consequence that the government is illegitimate. Finally, the
target "state" does not have a valid horizontal social contract-both
the state and the government are illegitimate.
72. Cf. Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, in
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 35, at 217, 229.
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A. Low-Intensity Operations Against a Fully Legitimate State
Assuming the justice of the cause and conformity to the other
moral constraints (i.e., proportionality and modus operandi), a low-
intensity operation will violate the sovereignty of its target state when
that sovereignty is fully legitimate, in other words, when both the
horizontal and the vertical contracts are legitimate.
The single exception, more apparent than real, to this principle
arises when the legitimate government of the target state authorizes
the operation, as is often the case with justified counter-insurgency.
For example, whether U.S. efforts to help the government of El
Salvador are barred by sovereignty considerations, other things being
equal, depends on whether that government is legitimate. If the
government is illegitimate, aid to that government is morally
prohibited, come what may, because even express authorization by an
illegitimate government is invalid. If the government is legitimate,
the morality of the operation does not depend on sovereignty
considerations, because of the authorization. Recall, however, that
other requirements, particularly that requirement of a just cause, must
still be fulfilled for the operation to be legitimate. A legitimate
government may not always espouse a just cause, so the operation
may be illegitimate on those grounds. In addition, the envisaged
operation may be banned for being disproportionate, or intrinsically
odious, or otherwise violative of human rights.
The Eichmann case may illustrate this point.73 In 1960, Israeli
agents located the infamous Nazi war criminal, Adolf Eichmann,
living under a false name in Argentina. They abducted him in
Argentina and took him to Israel, where he was tried, convicted,
sentenced to death, and hanged. At the time, both the Israeli and the
Argentine governments were legitimate.74  Was the operation
morally justified? This is a particularly instructive case, because
punishing a war criminal is a worthy aim, especially for those, such
as myself, who sympathize with retributivism. I believe, nevertheless,
that the Israeli government was not justified in kidnapping Eichmann,
as was recognized by the United Nations Security Council and the
Israelis themselves, who apologized to Argentina.
First, it is necessary to examine the underlying aim of the low-
intensity operation. I have indicated that the main justification of
73. Attorney-General of the Gov't of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (Dist. Ct. Jerusalem
1961), reprinted in D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-74
(4th ed. 1990).
74. This was one of the brief periods of civilian government in Argentina.
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international acts, and international coercion in particular, is the
defense of human rights. The punishment of a war criminal, even
one as evil as Eichmann, is a less compelling aim than a direct
defense of human rights. The Israelis had two possible justifications
for punishing Eichmann: retributive justice and deterrence. Retribu-
tive justice is an abstract idea of just desert that cannot easily be
linked to the defense of human rights, even if one otherwise accepts
the retributivist justification of punishment.' Deterrence is only
indirectly linked to the defense of human rights. A deterrence
argument would justify punishment of Eichmann in order to show
potential war criminals and mass murderers that they will suffer
should they violate human rights. Since the fear of punishment will
prevent some war crimes, so the argument goes, the probability of
rights violations will decrease.
Under either deterrence or retributivism, the goals pursued by
the Israeli government, while morally worthy, are insufficient to
outweigh a legitimate state's sovereignty. The Israelis should have
requested authorization from the Argentine government before they
abducted Eichmann. Even if the Argentines refused to help the
Israeli cause, and there is no evidence that they would have, I believe
that the moral foundations that support the sovereignty of a fully
legitimate state defeat legitimate retributive interests. Of course,
given the horrific nature of Eichmann's crimes, the Argentine
government would have acted immorally had it refused to surrender
or, in the alternative, prosecute Eichmann. Even then, Israel could
not justifiably seek a remedy that violated a legitimate state's
sovereignty. Members of the liberal alliance have a duty to resort to
rational methods of solving disputes. Low-intensity operations such
as abduction have no place within the alliance, no matter how noble
the cause or how vile the target of the operation.76
Assuming the most favorable facts for the United States
government, i.e., that Alvarez-Machain was in fact guilty of com-
plicity in acts of torture, the Alvarez-Machain case is morally
75. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State,
CRIMNAL JUSTICE ETHICS, Winter-Spring 1985, at 3. Kant's reason for rejecting deterrence
and adopting retribution is unsatisfactory-even creepy. See IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSI-
CAL ELEMENTS OF JusTIcE 99-106 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (criminals must be punished
because if we don't, we share in their blood guilt).
76. Of course, the situation changes radically when we change the dateline. Suppose
Eichmann is residing in Buenos Aires in 1978, sheltered by the fascist military regime. The
considerations against abducting him do not apply here, and Israel would have had a strong
moral case for conducting the operation. The requirement that the operation be as surgical
as possible (discussed in part VII infra) still applies.
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indistinguishable from the Eichmann case. Mexico is a legitimate
state, and the Mexican government a legitimate government. Mexico
is a full member of the liberal alliance; therefore, her sovereignty
must be respected. The United States has no right to intervene in
Mexico; moreover, it had a solemn duty to resort to the agreed-upon
methods of dealing with criminal fugitives, such as the extradition
treaty in force between the two nations.77 Had Mexico refused to
extradite Alvarez-Machain, the United States would not have been
justified in using coercion. Only diplomatic and judicial remedies,
such as a case in the World Court, are available among liberal
republics. It is unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court
refused to give even the slightest consideration to this central question
of international morality.
B. Low-Intensity Operations Against an Illegitimate Government
The second situation, in which the targeted state is legitimate,
but its government is not, is more complex. In such cases, assuming
all other necessary conditions are met, low-intensity operations are
legitimate only if they are directed against the government itself and
its instrumentalities. This means that the operations may not violate
the human rights of the citizens, nor disrupt their life in common.
The example of Iraq may serve to illustrate this point. I already
indicated that a legitimate government's assistance to an insurgency
of Iraqi citizens aimed at ousting the Iraqi dictator would be morally
justified.78 Suppose that the United States contemplates an operation
to destroy the arsenal of Iraq, in particular all those facilities and
mat6riel that may increase its nuclear capabilities. State sovereignty
does not preclude this operation, since it is directed against the
government and its instrumentalities, not against the citizens of
Iraq.79
In such cases, it is important to recall that the citizens have not
waived their human rights or their right to have a state, or a life in
common. Therefore, the operation must respect these rights and the
local institutions that represent their freely chosen life in common.
It must be tailored as narrowly as possible as an action against the
government, not the people. Some cases are relatively clear, such as
where action is taken to aid just revolutionaries against an illegitimate
77. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
78. See supra text accompanying note 60.
79. Recall that the other conditions must obtain. In this case, the aim-prevention of
aggression by a tyrannical government-is justified.
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government, or to protect imminent victims of a tyrant's repression,
or to rescue nationals in danger.
Even in these clear cases, the citizens of the target state have not
given up their state. The operation must respect the local institutions
reflective of their life in common. One hypothetical example may
help clarify this principle. Suppose the United States government has
detected in Cuba a notorious drug lord suspected of very serious
crimes in the United States. Is the United States morally justified in
abducting this person from Cuba? The Cuban government, we shall
assume, is illegitimate, but the Cuban state is not. In other words,
Cubans have a right as against foreigners that their life in common be
respected. This may include institutions such as the judicial system.
The answer to our question will depend on whether the courts in
Cuba are independent or subservient to the Castro regime. If the
former, the United States may not act and must instead utilize
diplomatic channels, such as a request for extradition. If the latter,
the courts are not an institution to administer justice to the Cuban
people, but rather a mere instrumentality of the illegitimate regime.
In this case, I suggest that the United States may act, provided the
operation satisfies the other requirements. Action is justifiable
because the United States would be doing no more than capturing a
suspected criminal from his hideout among a gang of outlaws of the
international community. After all, illegitimate governments are no
more than gangs of outlaws, usurpers.
Because the citizens in the target state retain their individual
rights, low-intensity operations are complicated by the very difficult,
and virtually unavoidable problem that some innocent people may be
injured or killed during an otherwise justified operation. The most
prominent doctrine to justify accidental and incidental killing of
innocent people in a just military action is the doctrine of double
effect, which is in part recognized by modem international law. 0
According to this doctrine, incidental loss of lives in war is not
prohibited if the intent of the just warrior is to obtain a military
80. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 51, 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977). (Indiscriminate attacks prohibited, but only "disprortionate" loss of
incidental lives prohibited). It is interesting to note that for the moral version of the doctrine,
just cause is essential, so that every death inflicted by the unjust warriors is unjustified. For
international law, however, just cause is irrelevant. The army on the wrong side of a war
may also cause incidental loss of lives under the doctrine of double effect.
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advantage, not to victimize innocents, even if he can foresee the
deaths of innocent people."
The doctrine of double effect, however, has been recently
challenged by Judith J. Thomson. Her critique is skeptical of the
moral relevance of the doctrine's crucial distinction between specific
intent to kill bystanders and mere foresight that bystanders will die.
In her view, if there is any justification for the incidental loss of lives
of bystanders in a war, it must depend on the justice of the cause-on
the larger purpose of the operation.82
Professor Thomson, however, bypasses this question as too
complicated, et pour cause: justifying the loss of innocent lives is
perhaps the major challenge faced by any non-utilitarian theory of
just war. Providing a fully satisfactory reply to critics of the
doctrine of double effect is beyond the scope of this discussion. I
will, however, make three observations. First, unless some justifica-
tion is supplied for the incidental killing of innocent people, no war
or revolution could ever be justified. I am aware, of course, that this
begs the larger question of the justification of war: maybe pacifists
are right, and no violence is ever justified; or maybe utilitarians are
right, and the only plausible thing to do is to weigh costs and benefits
of war. But if one rejects utilitarianism, and if one accepts as a point
of departure that sometimes fighting in a war or a revolution is the
morally right thing to do, then we must come up with some rights-
based justification for the incidental killing of bystanders. Second,
the justification for the incidental loss of innocent lives in a low-
intensity operation does not differ from the justification given for
such loss in conventional war. Whether one chooses the doctrine of
double effect or the "larger cause" doctrine' to justify incidental
loss of innocent lives in a just war, the same rationale is available for
justified low-intensity operations. Recall that the other constraints,
81. A recent version of the doctrine is offered in Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions,
and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 334-36
(1989).
82. See Judith J.Thomson, supra note 60, at 292-96.
83. In HuMANrrARIAN INTERVEN ION, I adopted Daniel Montaldi's suggestion that
incidental loss of lives in an otherwise justified war can sometimes be justified by reference
to the nature of the evil that the just warriors are attempting to suppress. I suggested that
the suppression of serious and disrespectful human rights violations was an interest
compelling enough to outweigh, sometimes, the bystanders' right to life. TEs6N,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVEMION, supra note 16, 96-102. Although I think I was on the right
track, this view (which is consistent with Thomson's "larger cause" suggestion) needs to be
elaborated further.
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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such as proportionality and modus operandi, always apply. Finally,
there is at least a clear difference in blameworthiness between the
warrior fighting for a just cause who diligently tries to protect
innocents, and the just warrior who chooses to terrorize and victimize
them in his pursuit of the just end. A low-intensity operation against
an illegitimate government, then, must not be aimed at innocent
people, even if that is conducive to the demise of the tyrant.
Moreover, the agents conducting the low-intensity operation must
design it with the protection of bystanders in mind.
D. Low-Intensity Operations Against an Illegitimate State
When the target state is illegitimate, the social contract has
collapsed, and sovereignty considerations no longer apply. In some
instances where the horizontal contract has disintegrated, anarchy
reigns and different groups may control different parts of the
territory." The aim of the low-intensity operation has to be justified
under just-war theory, and, as always, the individual rights of the
residents ought to be respected. All the considerations regarding
innocent bystanders discussed in the previous section apply here as
well.
It is crucial that the people be allowed to rebuild a legitimate
state if they wish to do so. Humanitarian intervention must be
accompanied by measures facilitating the political reorganization of
local forces on the basis of free elections and respect for human
rights. People who traditionally have lived in a region must be
permitted freely to enter into a social contract.86 These are not easy
questions to answer, and the solutions will vary considerably
depending on the facts.
VI. NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
The main purpose of this paper has been to suggest principles
with which to evaluate low-intensity operations in the light of state
sovereignty. Two other conditions, however, further restrict the
legitimacy of these operations.
The first is the customary requirement of necessity and pro-
portionality. Low-intensity operations satisfy the requirement of
85. Lebanon until recently and Somalia and Yugoslavia today may be examples of this
situation.
86. By "freely," I refer to individual freedom.
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necessity only if no less intrusive means are available to accomplish
the same goal. Proportionality involves calculations of the costs and
benefits of the low intensity operation in a way that is not solely
dependent upon the national interest, however measured. The general
rule is that the coercion used in the operation and the consequent
harm done by it have to be proportionate to the importance of the
interest that is being served, both in terms of the intrinsic moral
weight of the goal, and in terms of the extent to which that goal is
served.
VII. THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE OPERATION COMPLY wrrH
MINIMAL NOTIONS OF DECENCY
The second of these final conditions for a morally defensible
low-intensity operation is that the operation must not be so odious in
its modus operandi as to be corruptive of the virtues that people must
exhibit in a liberal democracy. The operation should not be morally
self-defeating. 7 This requirement rests upon an important moral
insight: there are things we cannot do to others because of what they
are (i.e., they hold rights), and there are things we cannot do to others
because of what we are.88 What are we? As individuals having
inherent dignity and value, and as members of a just civil society-a
liberal democracy-we must act in such a way as to cultivate our
civic virtues and best character traits. This applies, a fortiori, to
actions by the government, which is supposed to act for the polis. In
part, the insistence on governmental virtue in the conduct of foreign
policy derives from self-interest; we cannot expect our government to
behave honorably by us if it goes around the globe sending hit squads
to assassinate and torture people, even for just causes.89
An example may help illustrate this proposition. Is it morally
permissible to assassinate Saddam Hussein? I would think not. The
proper course of action is to help the Iraqis overthrow him, capture
87. Virtue theory is usually traced back to Aristotle. See generally NANCY SHERMAN,
THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF VIRTUE (1989). For a contemporary
account, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.
1984). The effect of adding virtue considerations to rights considerations is that the scope
of morality is enlarged. In that sense, virtue theory provides important insights and
supplements to liberal rights theory. However, contrary to virtue theorists, I regard civic
virtues as parasitic on the values that underlie a liberal democracy, not the other way round.
88. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPI-RCAL EXPLANATIONS 400-02 (1981).
89. See generally Thomas Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MORALTrY 75, 78-79 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) (discussing whether public morality can
be derived from public morality).
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him, and bring him to trial before Iraqi courts or an international
criminal court in accordance with internationally accepted norms of
fair trial. Assassination is banned, not because the punishment is
necessarily inappropriate in light of Hussein's crimes, but rather
because agents of a liberal democracy must conduct themselves in a
way that honors the civic virtues for which they stand. Criminal
punishment can only be imposed through the mechanisms allowed by
liberal society. The same reasoning applies to other intrinsically
contemptible modes of action, such as torture and terrorism, regard-
less of sovereignty considerations, just cause, or national interest.'
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this paper that low-intensity operations, such as
the abduction of Alvarez-Machain may be justified only when all of
the following circumstances prevail: the contemplated actions further
a just cause; they do not infringe the target state's sovereignty-
which is itself a function of internal legitimacy; they otherwise
respect human rights; they are necessary and proportionate; they
comply with minimal norms of decency as to their mode of imple-
mentation.
In the Alvarez-Machain situation, the target state and govern-
ment were both legitimate. Therefore, the United States could not
justifiably ignore the extradition procedures provided by treaty. The
moral analysis supports a per se legal rule that intervention is not
allowed against fully legitimate states. State-sponsored abductions
against fully legitimate states are therefore prohibited. Low-intensity
operations may sometimes be justified against illegitimate states or
governments.
My account of the moral legitimacy of low-intensity operations
sets aside the morally bankrupt obsession with national interest, and
substitutes instead the defense of human rights and just institutions.
As the world moves toward the liberal alliance that was predicted by
Immanuel Kant two hundred years ago, low-intensity operations will
gradually become less important, for the same reasons that overt
conflict will decrease.91 Members of the alliance will rely upon
90. Of course, Saddam Hussein may die at the hands of agents sent to arrest him if he
chooses to resist, and the action will not thereby become illegitimate.
91. See Michael Doyle, KANT, LIBERAL LEGACIES, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (PART I),
12 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 205, 225-232 (1983); Tes6n, The Kantian Theory of International Law,
supra note 16, at 74-81.
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their mutual commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law; international disputes will gradually be entrusted to international
institutions. There is a crucial proviso: tyrants have no place in this
scenario. The international state system will not achieve peace and
stability as long as international law continues to protect dictators
under the guise of state sovereignty. The main cause of war, and the
main reason why democracies feel the need to carry out low-intensity
operations, is the existence of such enemies of freedom, in and out of
government. Only a truly universal movement toward democracy will
render low-intensity operations obsolete.
